UNMIN: Mission impossible?Nepal Politics

By DR RAMESH DAHAL
Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was established by the UN in response to the request of the Seven-Party Alliance and the CPN (Maoist) with the objective of creating a free and fair atmosphere for the CA polls and the entire peace process. More than a year has gone by, but UNMIN’s performance, activities and efforts have been unsatisfactory and not in compliance with its entrusted mandate. This calls for a serious scrutiny.
UNMIN’s incompetent handling of its responsibilities could be seen from the very beginning of its mission when it started registering Maoist combatants and their arms. UNMIN had recorded 31,318 combatants at the beginning. The second round of verification revealed only 19,612 qualified combatants. Had the third verification taken place, the total number of cadres would undeniably have been further reduced.
One thing that needs to be mentioned here is that the registration process was conducted in phases in different places and spread out over a long period of time. This provided the Maoists ample time to prepare and train their proxy cadres to fit the UNMIN criteria, thereby allowing them to raise their numerical strength in a massive way and extract more money from the government. During the verification process at one of the Maoist cantonments in Ilam when many combatants were declared disqualified, the Maoists had bullied UNMIN into raising the pass rate.
UNMIN’s incompetence doesn’t end here. The number of registered weapons of the Maoists stands at 3,482 units. This figure seems rather incongruous considering that the Maoists have 19,612 fighters. This raises serious doubts about the standards set by UNMIN for the combatants. How can there be a combatant without a weapon? How could UNMIN have swallowed Prachanda’s ludicrous story that the rest of their guns were swept away by a river or destroyed in a fire? Preposterous!
Had UNMIN stuck to the “one weapon one combatant” theory, the Maoists would have been forced to reveal all the firearms they have stashed away out of sight. Can UNMIN admit that they have failed miserably in fulfilling one of their prime responsibilities of registering Maoist arms and combatants?
It is evident that the Maoists have been using UNMIN as a means of securing national and international legitimacy. UNMIN seems ignorant of the high-handed behavior of the Maoists who have been spreading havoc and making a mockery of the peace accord. UNMIN has often been criticized for its ineffectual performance, but each time it takes refuge behind the excuse that it has a limited mandate. What do the Nepali people make of that? Do we say that UNMIN has been pursuing a myopic policy in managing Nepal’s conflict?
Ian Martin, the head of the mission, is familiar with Nepal’s war history and its broader political equations. Before taking over UNMIN, he had served as chief of the OHCHR in Nepal. Moreover, Martin has, in varied capacities, dealt with diverse conflict situations in hot spots as wide-ranging as Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Eritrea and East Timor. How couldn’t somebody with such extensive experience in conflict management not push for a mandate suitable to Nepal’s situation?
UNMIN’s performance in monitoring Maoist cantonments is equally poor. The cantonments don’t have proper fences. There are frequent reports in the media of Maoist fighters walking in and out of the camps at will. Many of the combatants are reported to have taken up a new role as YCL cadres who have been working hard to win the coming election through intimidation and coercion. Maoist combatants have been roaming around freely in the capital and other parts of the country brandishing weapons with UN stickers on them. Why can’t UNMIN do anything about that? This is the greatest threat to the peace process and the electoral system.
Recent times have also seen the emergence of more than three dozen violent criminal outfits on the basis of religion, caste and region. The Kapilvastu communal riots and the Gaur massacre occurred in the presence of UNMIN.
UNMIN’s transparency and governance is another matter that needs to be examined. It has been observed that the UN always implements tested and proven models in conflict-ridden countries. The DDR process continuing in Nepal is not known to all. The conflict in Nepal is not only ideological, it is also colored with regionalism and ethnicity. Whatever models the UN has applied in the failed African countries could be disastrous here.
India has strongly criticized UNMIN for holding clandestine meetings with some Nepali armed groups on Indian soil. UNMIN seems to have been mixing with marginalized and ethnic communities against which PM Koirala has expressed dissatisfaction as overstepping its mandate.
UNMIN should conduct itself as a “neutral party” without taking sides and without any consideration to party, class or ethnicity. The Maoists have been celebrating their victory day on November 24 to mark their successful attack on the Nepal Army in Dang. When UNMIN representatives participate in the ceremony in Chitwan and inspect the guard of honor, it can’t be considered as impartial behavior. Moreover, UNMIN has been encouraging the atrocious militants and trying to put them on the same level as the Nepal Army. Isn’t it unfair to the national army which has been abiding by the peace accords and working as per the aspirations of the Nepali people?
This is the other dubious aspect of UNMIN about which the Nepali people do not know. Should the UNMIN chief be briefing only the UN headquarters? Shouldn’t he be informing the general public, the government and various other groups in Nepal too? The recent tragic accident of an UNMIN helicopter in Ramechhap where the media was denied access and the people their right to information provides a good reflection of UNMIN’s working style. UNMIN needs to do a thorough introspection. We do not want it to be a failed mission. Nor do we want it to be just a white elephant or an INGO. (Kantipuronline)